Negative Consequences Of Pollution

Negative Consequences Of Pollution Externalities are known as the third party effects evolving from the production and consumption of goods and services in which the third party does not receive any appropriate consumption. Externalities are the root to market failure if the pricing system does not consider the social costs and benefits of production and consumption. The provision of the incorrect quantity of goods and services to customers by the market mechanism sources a deficit in social welfare in an effective working market society ought to disperse property rights. If no individual is the owner of a specific good then nobody has an economic incentive to safeguard that good from being harmed. This is directed towards the tragedy of commons where, for instance no particular person owns the ocean or the fish in the ocean therefore the deficiency of the population of living fish is annihilated by the fishing industry. Resulting from the absence of clearly defined property rights, markets are unable to completely ac count for them, assigning prices of goods and services. Studying a scenario that lacks government intrusion, as no one owns the air, polluting industries do not raise their prices to recompense for correcting their pollution because they fail to undo air pollution and this will ultimately result in health difficulties among third parties and these third parties ought to then pay for the rectification of their health. According to the World Health Organizations three million people are killed around the world and this is attributed to outdoor air pollution (annually) by motor vehicles and industrial emissions and 1.6 million indoors from the usage of solid fuels. There exists a range of studies that estimate that 7-20% of all cancers are caused by air pollution (only). Waterborne diseases are accountable for 80% of infirmity and deaths in developing nations, claiming a childs life in every eight seconds. Contaminated water is the sole cause of the deaths of 2.1 million humans who fal l victim to diseases that are linked to contaminated water sources. Contaminated land is a severe problem in developed nations as industries and power stations dispose of heavy metals in the soil. One shocking feature of agriculture is its potential to poison land with pesticides, nitrate-rich fertilizers and faeces from cattle and this is coupled with the fact that contamination that reaches rivers harm various life-forms. To the economist the problem that arises from externalities is not that the activity occurs, but that a surplus of it occurs. To locate the market outcome we begin by using supply and demand. The market price and quantity are represented by Pmkt and Qmkt in figure 1 below However, the market outcome is not the efficient result. The supply curve illustrates only the private costs of production, mainly the costs occurred by those firms producing the good. Costs are inflicted on innocent bystanders due to negative externalities therefore it does not symbolize all costs. Therefore we draw another curve the social cost or SC curve. This diagram signifies all costs of the product including private production costs and external costs. The efficient level of outcome occurs where the demand curve and SC curve intersect which is depicted by P* and Q*. Qmkt > Q* meaning that the market produces greater levels of amounts of this good than the efficient amount, this phenomenon is known as over production. Another notification of Pmkt < P* means that the market price is less than the efficient price. Reason being that the market outcome is so inefficient is due to the fact that the private market leads suppliers to produce some units of the good (between Q* and Qmk t) whose cost of production exceeds their value to consumers. It is believed that this is true because the units of the good between Q* and Qmkt, the demand curve (measuring value to consumers) is below the SC curve (measuring all costs). The overproduction of goods with negative externalities transpires because the price of the good that the buyer does not fully cover all of the costs of producing or consuming the good. If all costs were taken into consideration, then prices of these goods would be superior and people would utilize of them. If the costs of the negative externalities, the harm from pollution were put on the good as a tax, then people would become conscious of the full cost of producing and consuming that good and the efficient amount would be the smaller amount demanded. From the above graph we can come to the conclusion about all market allocations of commodities causing pollution externalities. ie.the output of the commodity is too large, too much pollution is pro duced, the prices of products responsible for pollution are too low, as long as the costs are external, no incentives to search for ways to yield less pollution per unit of output are introduced by the market and recycling and reuse of the polluting substances are discouraged since release into the environment is so inefficiently cheap. A property right is the restricted authority to resolve how a specific resource is used whether a resource is owned by government or individuals (Alchian, 2008). Property rights must clearly be defined, their use must be scrutinized and possession of rights enforced (Alchian, 2008). Transaction costs are the costs of defining, monitoring and enforcing these rights (Alchian, 2008). There are four different types of property rights mainly open access, common property and private property (Pearce, 1989). Open-access property does not have an owner, is non-excludable, that is no one can prohibit another individual from making use of it, and is non-rival, the use of the property by one individual will not restrict of prevent its use at the same time by another individual. Open- access property unsupervised and access to it is not restricted. The existence of open-access property arose from the fact that the ownership of the property has never been established, either because the state has legislated it, because no efficient controls are in place, or it is not considered feasible because the cost of exclusion overshadows the benefits. Open-access property can be converted by the state into private, common or state property through legislature, clearly defining rights and enforcing them. Examples of open-access resources which the state may convert include the atmosphere and ocean fisheries. State property, is owned by everyone however, access to the property and the use of it is controlled by the state, example a national park. Common property is controlled by a group of individuals, who are responsible for access to, use of and exclusion from the property. Private property grant strict control to the owner, who has control over the use, management and access of property, the owners may prevent another individual, if they want to, from using the property, and they can also restrict the simultaneous use of the property. The polluter-pays-principle and victim-pays- principle is dependant on the provision of property rights for environmental goods. The costs of pollution are to be borne out of those who instigated it stated by the polluter-pays-principle. Its goal is to determine how the costs of pollution prevention and control must be assigned: the polluter must pay. Its objective is the internalization of environmental externalities of economic activities so prices of goods and services completely depict the costs of production. Bugge (1996) acknowledged four types of ppp; economically, it promotes efficiency; legally it promotes justice; it promotes harmonization of international environmental policies; as well as it defines how to allocate costs within a state. The ownership of environmental goods rights are undefined and by default it is the polluters that are usually favoured. If no appropriate bylaws are put in place to ban polluting activities and property rights are indeterminate, polluters will implicitly have the upper hand. As these polluting activities are aggravated and societys welfare becomes more pretentious, the victims of these activities will band together to maintain their right to a protected environment. This will eventually lead to regulation being put into practice which will shift property rights towards victims until equilibrium ie. between optimal pollution and optimal pollution abatement is reached. This equilibrium is shown by the intersection between the marginal abatement cost and the marginal damage cost schedules, .Coase illustrates this result by using the example of a farmer cultivating his land and another who breeds cattle that needs that needs land to graze on. Both individuals have adjoining land which is not enclosed. There are two possible consequences depending on how property rights are allocated; case1, the law is in favour of the farmer breeding cattle. Nothing prevents the cattle from grazing on the other land. The latter will have an incentive to bargain with the farmer and try to get him to reduce the damage done to his crops by reducing the herd. Case 2; the law is in favour of the farmer with crops. The farmer with the cattle is responsible for the damage his herd causes to others crops and must pay for these damages. It is in his interest to negotiate to try and reduce his costs. The effectiveness of this bargaining process rests on assumptions regarding the economic definition of environmental property rights. Tietenberg (1992) states that the structure of the property rights is characterized as follows: universitality, all existing resources are allocated; exclusivity, all costs and benefits from the possession or use of resources are attributed to the holders of the r ights either directly or indirectly; transferability, all rights are transferable through voluntary exchange between agents; protection, property rights are protected from voluntary or expropriation. According to the coase theorem everyone has perfect information, consumers and producers are price-takers, there is a costless court system for establishing, producers maximize profits and consumers maximize utility, there are no income and wealth effects as well as no transaction costs. The initial allocation of property rights does not matter for efficiency but if any of the conditions do not hold then the initial assignments of property rights matter. When property rights are apportioned to polluters, the victims of pollution will be enthused to bargain. If the victims are in possession of the property rights then polluters will instigate negotiation. Optimal pollution and optimal abatement must be taken into consideration to determine the situation where rights are optimally allocated. Figure 2 The above diagram depicts the process. The vertical axis illustrates the level of costs involved and the horizontal axis depicts the level of reduction in pollution. MDC is the marginal external costs and the MDC illustrates the level of reduction in pollution. The equilibrium is determined at Z* where MRC intersects the MDC curve. The polluting firms will produce its maximum level of output when there is no reduction in pollution. In contrast the level of production will be the lowest when there is a complete reduction in pollution. This figure can be linked up back to the preceding cases in respect to the establishment of property rights. At Z0 the level of pollution is maximized hence there is no reduction in pollution. This implies that that both the polluter and the victims are given the rights. At the reduction in pollution is at its maximum hence the rights are given to victims. When the polluters activity influence the welfare of a sufferer an external cost is generated and the sufferer should be compensated. Ronald Coase (1960) pointed out that sufferers and polluters are incorporated in negotiating incentives of an efficient level of unfavorable impacts regarding of the assignment of rights when the transaction cost is negligible. The illustration above portrays the output level a firm will operate at (Qà Ã¢â€š ¬), where profits are maximized, however the social optimum is at Q*. When the sufferer has the property rights, the polluter does not have the right to pollute and the sufferer has the right not to be polluted. The sufferer chooses not to have any pollution at the starting point and at the origin the two parties begin to bargain. If they moved to d, the polluter would obtain Oabd in profit and the sufferer would lose Ocd. There is a chance that bargaining could occur as OABD is greater than OCD. The polluter will make a proposition of compensation to the sufferer since Oabd is greater than Ocd and less than Oabd. If this bargain happens, there is a movement to d which is known as a Pareto optimal allocation as one party is better off, (sufferer lost Ocd but gained more in compensation) and no party is worse off (polluter still has net profit). A move to the right of Q* is not plausible because pollut ers gains are less than the victims losses. Therefore the polluting firm wont compensate the sufferer to move beyond Q*. Now if the property rights are assigned to the polluter, start at Qà Ã¢â€š ¬ because its the point at which the polluter can take advantage of his right to use the environment to dispose of his waste products. It is again possible for the two parties to bargain and move from Qà Ã¢â€š ¬ back to f. Here the sufferer can compensate the polluter to give up a certain amount of economic activity or output level. The sufferer is willing to tolerate a loss fhi Qà Ã¢â€š ¬ if the move does not take place and will offer an amount less than this to get the polluter to cut back pollution. The polluter is prepared to accept an amount greater than fgQà Ã¢â€š ¬. i.e. the profits will be relinquished as long as there is a probability of bargaining between the polluter and sufferer the market will take us to the social optimum ie Q. The commons can be referred to as a society composed of the population. According to Hardin the idea that everyone born with equivalent rights to the commons in sharing resources, concurrently with overpopulation will destroy the commons, therefore tragedy of the commons. Overpopulation and pollution are the contributing factors that facilitate the commons not being sustainable. The South African population was 40.6 million in 1996 and is persistently growing at 2 percent per year. A continuation of this trend by the year 2035 will result in 82 million of the inhabitants relying on an equivalent level of natural resources which are already under strain in sufficiently meeting its demands, therefore escalating the production of pollution and waste. The burdens of overpopulation on natural resources uniting with cooperate greed leads to detrimental consequences. A case in point is one of the Toxic water rising below Johannesburg. Twenty miles North West of Johannesburg, the water from the spring runs blood red. It is toxic, highly acidic and bursting with heavy metals, so foul those animals in the Kruderdorp Game reserve downstream say no to drinking the water causing them to die of thirst therefore not one living organism is able to endure this venomous water. Millions of gallons of this toxic water lie beneath Johannesburg, a municipality with a population of nearly four million citizens. The water is rises at fifty feet a month. If this persists, in roughly two years time subterranean parking garages will be filled up with this deadly red water. Tunnels for electrical cables and underground railway stations will overflow. Unnatural crimson water pours out from the ground leading into the suburbs and eventually fleeing into the east of Johannesburg. Due to Johannesburgs gold rush, mining companies extort enormous holes under its city and s uburbs. When it rains much is soaked up in the earth and the water becomes toxic when combined with heavy metals underground. Terry McCarthy, a geology professor of the university Witwatersrand warn that existing mining operations in other parts of South Africa were on their part to destruction and it would eventually poison some of Johannesburgs main drinking water resources, causing future generations to be imposed with greater costs of the Vaal Dam and Vaal river. The tragedy of the commons relates to almost every commonly held property. Individuals and firms accept a hundred percent of the gains of easy disposal of waste into air or water but only sustain a fraction of these negative impacts of pollution. It is therefore necessary for government to control pollution, providing incentives to prevent pollution or inflicting penalties should pollution occur. Another example is that of national parks where the parks can be accessed by everyone without limits to visitation. As the number of visits multiply degradation of parks become more plausible. The finite number of parks combined with increasing visitation and population growth makes conservation efforts difficult. In order to avoid the tragedy of the commons population control is a need. Hardin proposes that laws, legislators, beuros and watchers who watch the beuros to legislate and enforce laws are the key elements of controlling the population in the commons. He also emphasize that conscience and sense of guilt are not enough to restrict the population. People can freely make choices between the options offered by the laws, but are compelled to choose the options that brings themselves under control. Reason being if they choose the unrestrained option they will have to pay more prices or run more risks of losing something valuable. For example people believe that if the accept compulsory taxes because they understand voluntary taxes would favor the conscienceless people who dont pay taxes at all. Hardin ends with establishing that education can put an end to the tragedy of the commons. There are numerous reasons as to why a coasian solution may not work; ie. transaction costs, state of competition, the free- rider problem, identifying polluters and victims and people unwilling to trade transaction cost include information and measurement costs, negotiation costs, contracting (legal costs) and monitoring and enforcing costs. The cost of setting up the contract between polluter and victim becomes excessive because of the countless polluters and sufferers. The many questions become controversial including who is suffering, whose polluting and by how much? How much will resolve the bribe or payment and will defer among individuals. A coasian solution works well when there is perfect competition, on the contrary it is feasible to get such a solution under imperfect competition but the analysis is much more complex. Due to environmental goods being classed as public goods, the free- rider problem poses a dilemma as the provision of public goods would not be sufficient if left to the private sector. Since convincing everyone to play a part in diminishing incentives to cheating on agreements remain intricate. Predicted by the game theory models, bargaining would make vulnerable. If there are clearly defined property rights and contracts are drawn up then those rights that are allocated to may be unwillingly to trade. Some government intervention is needed in environmental conflicts by inflicting either liability or property rules. Property rules stipulate the allocation of the entitlement. Example entitlements include the right to pollute the air or on the other hand, the right to fresh, clean air. When applying the property rules the court decides on which right is paramount and places an injunction against the infringement of that right. The Coase Theorem involves establishing property rights as a means to solve the creation of externalities. This essay has been based on the negative externalities of pollution, the formation of property rights, bargaining in addition to a critique of the tragedy of the commons. It has been found that although there are no government interventions in a free market economy, courts are still required to intervene in the establishment of the property rights. Furthermore it has included a discussion on the main consequences of over pollution and ways in which government could solve this problem. It went on to give reasoning as to why the coasian solutions may be falsified which was illustrated by examples throughout the essay.

Critically examine the architecture, routines, and culture (ARC) framework of organisational design as proposed by Saloner, Shepard and Podolny in Strategic Management Essay

The design of an organisation is highly crucial for a firm in today’s world in order for it to achieve and sustain its competitive advantage that will place the firm in a stronger position than its rivals. The firm can manipulate the components of organisation design, fit these elements with one another and with the strategy, to impact the firm’s performance. Hence, the goal for the organisation is to have a good fit between the firm’s design and its competitive advantage in order for the firm to be strategically aligned with the strategy. Any effective design will have to address 2 general problems: the coordination and incentive problems and must do so in a way that supports the organisation’s strategy. The firm can make use of the Architecture, Routines and Culture (ARC) framework to grapple these problems. This essay will firstly describe how the ARC framework can be implemented accordingly. An effective design will depend on the 3 elements working together and so, these interactions will be analysed. In addition, the implications of the framework will be examined too. To start, we need to define each component of the ARC framework. Firstly, the architecture refers to the dividing of the firm into subunits and establishing linkages among these groups. Secondly, routines are the formal and informal procedures while carrying out tasks developed from repetition. They embody established interfaces which pertains certain expectations about what will flow across them and a protocol for accomplishing the transfer. Lastly, culture is the commonly held values and beliefs of individuals within the organisation and once deeply embedded, is the evaluative criteria for behaviour and decision making in the firm. The 2 main challenges of organisation design are the coordination and incentive problems. As they are interrelated, their effects are intertwined and addressing one could impact the other. The coordination problem refers to the challenge of establishing an organisation design that achieves an efficient deployment of assets within the firm so that it can achieve its objectives as efficiently as possible. There are several crux of the coordination problem: balancing the gains from specialisation and the gains from integration; and how the decision making process is designed with the need for access to information flows. The incentive problem refers to eliciting the right amount and type of effort in the presence of hidden information and hidden action. It arises from the divergence of interests and objectives of the manager and the shareholders and is most commonly linked to the Principal-Agent problem. Having explained the key concepts, the coordination and incentive problems will be addressed with the ARC framework. In order to construct an organisation structure, the firm is broken down into subunits and such delineation impacts information and resource flows within the firm. To tackle this, one has to match an architecture structure which minimises coordination problem. An argument from the Strategic Management would be whether functional or divisional structures would be better to deal with it. A functional organisation is one which groups individuals according to the tasks they perform. The different functional groups (R&D, marketing, finance et.cetra) are clustered together to be overseen by a superior. Such a classification of groupings reaps the benefits of specialisation as information sharing and learning is facilitated. There is an efficient spread of knowledge and incubation of ideas among the specialists such as in the R&D sector where creative ideas can be built upon other’s ideas to attain innovation. Functional division allows better problem solving process as having similar specialists such as engineers in a group can lead to early detection of a manufacturing glitch and faster solving speed. In addition, there is a clear hierarchy with well-defined positions established within each function. The role of advancement is clear and hence employees are motivated to specialise and invest heavily in human capital to advance. On the other hand, divisional structure differs as the primary subunits are classified based on business divisions and under each of them are functional sub divisions. This allows for better facilitation of coordination across functions especially as the firm increases in scale and scope. If a retail firm divisions according to the different customer group it serves: Women and Children, both sub-divisions are served by functional groups. The design team could learn quickly about the change in taste of its customer group from the sales team of which will not be possible if the teams did not operate under the same subunit. This supports Alfred Chandler’s claim that divisional structure enhances accountability and communication. Hierarchy too, is an important factor to consider when structuring a firm to address coordination problem. Since the communication among managers together with the dissemination of information and shared resources to the groups coordinates the actions of the subunits, the level and nature of hierarchy affects the effectiveness of the communication process. Passing information through each level consumes resources, causes delays and degrades the information by introducing noise and distortion. This justifies the allocation of decision-making rights to those who have the most immediate access to the relevant information. However, decision makers may not know how their decisions will affect the other subunits. Away to address this is to create a formal linking mechanism that coordinates the decision across subunits or to centralise authority for only decisions which require more coordination. Horizontal linkages can also be established across units to achieve coordination. Its mechanisms facilitate information and resource flows without affecting the organisation of the subunits and this allows cooperation across units without sacrificing the gains from specialisation and decentralisation. There are several forms ranging from informal to formal procedures which include personal network, liaison, task forces and integrators. The selection among these options depends on the interdependence among subunits. More interdependent subunits will require a more tightly coupled design. Horizontal linkages benefits are 2 fold: they promote information flows and they get the firm away from rigidity. An apt example would be the strategy of the Japanese auto mobile firms located in the United Kingdom. The managers and workers share common facilities and by doing so, horizontal linkages are built in the firm on a less formal setting with a flatter structure. Managers dine with the workers and this provides the platform for the quick dissemination of information and decision making. Under the ARC analysis, routines also solves coordination problem as the established interfaces bring about large coordination gains. With each worker clear of his roles and the procedures, gains from specialisation is reaped. More importantly, huge informational efficiencies are gained as when tasks proceed from one unit to another, minimal amounts of information is needed to be communicated between units as each unit only needs to know the information to carry out its part. Decision making routine also facilitates the decision making process as it is applied every time a decision is made, thereby excluding biased and inefficiency from disagreements among decision makers. Lastly, a routine way for one division to access the resources in another division enables the firm to coordinate in ways that would be difficult if the firm has to make a new resource sharing decision each time. ulture too, induces cooperation. With a common set of beliefs, members of the firm will not approve of actions that violate the culture of the firm. The workers are naturally coordinated in actions and appropriate behaviour. With a well developed norm of reciprocity, resource and information sharing can be achieved between and across subunits and this enhances cooperation. Also, culture helps employees focus on tasks that are important for the competitive advantage of the firm. The ARC framework can be implemented to deal with the incentive problems as follows. Compensation and reward schemes can be designed to induce desirable behaviour. Financial incentives are a strong motivation for workers to act in profit-maximising behaviour. However, this can lead to the substantial variation compensation over time and it is difficult to ascertain the profit impact of the units’ activities. To reward more accurately, compensation can be tied to a combination of imperfect indicators of unit performance according to the 4 rules of thumb. However, these indicators are subjective and the cost of collecting and analysing the data could be too great. Architecture structure should also be considered to minimise the incentive problem by affecting the importance of cooperation across units. If decisions cut across 2 separate organisation units, the identities and performances of them are intertwined and this brings a self-interest reason to assist the other and cooperate. However, not fully owning the consequence of performance will dilute incentives for individual performance. Architecture has its limitations in dealing with the incentive problem and the other elements are important to better solve it. Routines improve the incentive problem, but also not to a great extent. They do create opportunities to get better indicators of performance of which can be incorporated with the architecture compensation scheme of combining incentives from other indicators of performance. Routines can also automate activities for which it is otherwise difficult to provide incentives for. Lastly, culture plays a stronger rule in addressing the incentive problem as it targets the foundation of the issue of aligning interests. With a strong culture, it is possible to have the firm and subunits share similar goals thereby evoking that particular behaviour from individuals without pecuniary rewards. Suppose a consultancy firm’s competitive advantage lies in providing effective solutions to their clients’ problem, it can spread this belief to its employees. If the employees attain considerable satisfaction from delivering results, they will behave in ways aligned with the company’s competitive advantage without the need of the firm to offer financial incentives for this behaviour. However, the difficulty in reinforcing culture has to be accounted for as it could meet resistance in a change in mindset among the employees. Yet once established, culture leads to an effective organisation design. Within the ARC framework, the elements of the organisation design interact with each other to solve the challenges posed. An example could be how the culture could influence the routines of the firm as the standardised interfaces could be derived from the culture. With the norm of reciprocity in the firm, resource sharing routine will be established in such a way that subunits are more willing to share resources in order to solve the effective deployment of resources from the coordination problem. Another perspective of the ARC interaction could be how culture affects architecture. If a firm has an open-minded culture, it could direct the style of structure to a flatter hierarchy with more interaction between subordinates and superiors. This encourages improved flow of information asset in the firm. Using the ARC framework suggests many implications for the organisation. Given the complexity and intricate relationships between the elements of the firm’s ARC and the organisation design problems, designing the organisation is not as straight forward a task for the managers. The managers will require a deep understanding and strong execution of the elements of the firm’s ARC or more problems could arise. A possible solution proposed by Saloner, Shepard and Podolny is to have a systematic approach to collecting information on the design challenge facing the firm and design elements. There are 2 parts to carrying it out of which the first is to ask and analyse problems that would be addressed if the organisation is restructured. The second part poses questions to gather a good description of the firm’s current ARC. The managers are to identify any inconsistencies among the elements that are making the organisation less effective as it could be. Although this approach allows more accurate identifying of the weak areas of the ARC, managers will still have to learn by doing and tweak their policies over time for the optimal design. A second implication would be the need for the framework to be dynamic so as to achieve organisation agility. As an organisation is designed to obtain a competitive advantage for the firm, it is pertinent that the nature of its competitive advantage is considered. The organisation design has to be flexible and change in tandem with the changing needs of the competitive advantage. Hence, there is no one best design to accommodate all considerations. Firstly, firms must continually develop and deepen its current competitive advantage to meet the challenges of competition (exploiting). Secondly, the firm may want to alter its strategy to pursue another form of competitive advantage (explorer). A retail firm in an economy recession will need to change its competitive advantage to producing lower priced goods to garner market shares and can do this by flexibly changing its incentives to reward the manufacturing department based on sales volume, thereby producing at lower cost. Firms can meet this challenge by possessing elements of both exploration and exploitation to profit. Lastly, does the ARC framework act solely to design an organisation to achieve the firm’s competitive advantage? It could work better if complemented with other processes such as innovation. Innovation could be connected with organisation design to ensure a more sustainable competitive advantage. A firm could incentivise its employees based on how good they are in coming up with cutting edge technologies to promote innovation in the firm. In conclusion, the ARC framework has given a reasonable approach to design an organisation. Most of the arguments, however, assume according to Alfred Chandler’s view that â€Å"structure follows strategy†. Does this relationship need to follow as such so that the company structure runs parallel to the strategy? I beg to differ as the strategy and structure relates reciprocally and hence, the ARC framework could be at times used at the deciding factor of the company’s strategic planning too.

Characterization of Dmitry Dmitrich Gurov Essay - 1251 Words

Chekhov is part of a non-typical category of artists, because he did not believed in his genius, on the contrary, there are evidence that he believed that his work will not conquer time and posterity. Spectacular, just like Russia at the border between the 19th and 20th century, Chekhov was born the son of serfs in 1860 (Tsar Alexander will abolish serfdom in 1861) only to become a landlord 32 years later, and a neighbor of Prince Shakovskoi. He bought the Melikhovo estate (unconsciously imitating Tolstoy, the patriarch of Iasnaia Polyana), not far from Moscow, with 13 thousand rubles of which he has paid an advance of five thousand. Chekhov is the true precursor of the theater of the absurd. Before the beckettian waiting there was the†¦show more content†¦Neither is prepared to leave his family or to live a double life. Both suffer, but what they cherish the most is love, so they hope that in time they will find a solution. However, life brings them something different, something that nobody imagined - the civil war and revolution breaks out. The whole country is devastated by the tragic chaos of the revolution and their love disappears in the distance. Summary Lady with the Pet Dog is a short story written in 1899, a time when Chekhov spent most of the time in his house in Yalta. He lived usually alone and often weakened by the effects of tuberculosis, tired of the city’s provincialism, but never losing his charm and humor. He felt difficult to write in Yalta; also, he stopped working as a doctor some few years ago. Yalta became a kind of exile of his. It seems that Olga Knipper, - his sweet actress†, and wonderful woman often complained to him in long letter that she is depressed, and he tried to cheer her with the perspective of reunion (Benedetti, 112). In the short story Lady with the Pet Dog, what initially seems to be a simple adultery, as so many others, turns into a great love story. He, Dmitri Dmitrievich Gurov, a man passed his early youth, with an unhappy marriage in which, for years, has saved himself by throwing his life into countless love affairs, lives in Moscow. She, Anna Sergeyevna, very young,